Nov. 20, 2006
COMMENTARY: A U.S.-Caribbean Free Trade Area?
By Sir Ronald Sanders
Special to Huntington News Network
Should Caribbean Community (CARICOM) countries enter a Free Trade
Agreement
(FTA) with the United States? A few readers interpreted an observation
that
I made in my commentary (US mid-term elections and the Caribbean) to
mean
that I was advocating such an agreement.
In fact, I was not.
All that I did was to point out that “the Caribbean is yet to negotiate
a
Free Trade Agreement with the US”; CARICOM “has not seriously focussed”
on
such an agreement; and “time may be running out to get negotiations for
such
an agreement firmly underway” with the present US administration since
the
authority that Congress gave President George W Bush to sign such
agreements
ends in July 2007.
The matter of whether CARICOM countries should enter an FTA with the US
is
complex.
What are the arguments for CARICOM countries entering an FTA with the
US?
The main argument is that the US has entered FTA’s with other countries
whose goods and services compete with CARICOM’s in the US market. Among
these FTA’s is the agreement between the US, a number of Central
American
countries and the Dominican Republic.
When these FTA’s are up and running, the exports of these countries
will
adversely affect CARICOM products in the US market because they will
enter
the market on more advantageous terms.
CARICOM saw this happen when the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA)
was signed in 1994 by the US, Canada and Mexico.
Prior to NAFTA, certain goods from CARICOM countries enjoyed duty-free
treatment in the US market under the Caribbean Basin Initiative
introduced
by the Reagan administration. Once NAFTA came into force, those goods
could
not compete with similar products from Mexico.
But, the fact that the US is concluding FTA’s with other countries and
regions is not, by itself, sufficient reason for CARICOM countries to
enter
an agreement with the US.
The experience of Mexico with NAFTA clearly demonstrates that while
there
were benefits to Mexico in terms of lower tariffs on Mexican goods
entering
the US market, there was also a huge downside to the agreement.
For example, the US used non-tariff barriers to block Mexican products
that
began to give serious competition to US produced goods. At the same
time,
heavily subsidised US agricultural products, particularly corn, entered
the
Mexican market cheaper than Mexican farmers could produce them. This
led to
a displacement of Mexican farmers in their own domestic market.
Further, because Mexico had to drop its tariffs on goods imported from
the
US, the government’s tax revenues declined adversely affecting its
public
expenditure programme on education, housing and other social welfare
programmes.
CARICOM countries would face similar problems unless the FTA was
carefully
negotiated.
In the cases of Antigua and Barbuda, and the Bahamas whose economies
are
almost entirely reliant on services, particularly tourism and financial
services, they would hardly benefit from duty free entry to the US
market
for goods. Conversely, their governments would suffer a significant
loss of
revenue from lowering tariffs on imports from the US.
But, other CARICOM countries such as Belize, Jamaica, Guyana and
Trinidad
and Tobago, could find advantage in securing duty-free entry to the US
market for certain commodities.
Having said that, the point should also be made that already, without
an
FTA, many small farmers in CARICOM countries have lost markets within
their
own countries because subsidised US farm products are delivered to
Caribbean
supermarkets and hotels at prices that make it very difficult for local
farmers to compete. An FTA which requires CARICOM countries to lower
tariffs
on imports of US subsidised agricultural products would wipe out
Caribbean
small farmers altogether.
In all cases, CARICOM countries would want to set certain basic
criteria for
negotiations with the US. These would include: a means of imposing
duties
on products which the US subsidises; clear language to stop the US from
using non-tariff barriers to prohibit exports into its market;
non-reciprocity for the reduction of tariffs on certain goods for a
defined
period to allow Caribbean producers to develop the capacity to compete;
the
removal of restrictions on US imports of certain commodities such as
sugar;
and access to US capital as grants or as loans on soft terms to
compensate
for opening up Caribbean markets (aid for trade).
None of these criteria would be easy to achieve unless the US was
genuinely
concerned with helping CARICOM countries to develop and grow. If US
negotiators view an FTA with CARICOM in the same way that they would
regard
an agreement with, say, the European Union or South East Asian nations,
then
CARICOM would do well to scrap the idea before it starts.
What has to be established firmly in advance of negotiations on a
CARICOM-US
free trade agreement is that it would be development oriented.
Of course, this is also the problem that the Caribbean faces in its
current
negotiations with the European Union (EU) for Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPA’s). Caribbean countries, like their counterparts in
Africa
and the Pacific, feel that the EU is not taking sufficient account of
the
development dimension of the EPA’s.
And, at the even wider international level, the global negotiations on
trade
rules have stalled precisely because although developed countries
promised
at Doha in 2001 that these negotiations would focus on development,
they
have done nothing of the sort.
This is not to say that the US could not adopt a more enlightened and
ambitious approach to the CARICOM countries. For, the Caribbean is a
very
close neighbour, and what happens in the Caribbean should matter to the
US.
A genuine FTA with a strong development orientation would help the
small and
vulnerable countries of CARICOM enormously. Given the relatively small
size
both of the economies of CARICOM countries and their exports, the US
would
lose nothing by being generous and would gain much in terms of showing
concern for its neighbours.